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Introduction: Objective of this Study 
This retail banking case study of Sanwa Bank was completed under a three-
year research grant from the Sloan Foundation. The project's purpose is to 
examine in a series of case studies how US and Japanese firms who are recognized 
leaders in using information technology1 to achieve long-term sustainable 
advantage have organized and managed this process. While each case is complete 
in itself, each is part of this larger study.2 Research on Citibank as the counterpart 
case to Sanwa is underway. 
This retail banking case together with other cases3 support an initial research 
hypothesis that leading software users in the US and Japan are very sophisticated in the 
ways they have integrated software into their management strategies and use it to 
institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis. 
In Japan this strategy has involved heavy reliance on customized and semi-customized 
software (Rapp 1995) but is changing towards a more selective use of package software 
managed via customized systems. In turn, US firms, such as Merck, who have often 
relied more on packaged software, are doing more customization, especially for systems 
1 In this paper and for the purposes of the study software, information technology (IT) and systems are generally used 
interchangeably. In addition, when referring to the firm as a whole, the text will use " it", but when referring to 
management, " they" will be used. 
2
 The industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-Yokado and H. Butts), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), 
pharmaceuticals (Takeda and Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), investment banking (Nomura and Credit Suisse 
First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and USAA), autos (Toyota), steel (mini-mills and integrated mills, Nippon Steel, Tokyo 
Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (Isetan and Federated). These industries and cases were selected based the advice and 
research of specific industry centers funded by the Sloan Foundation. These are the computer and software center at Stanford, 
the semiconductor and software centers at Berkeley, the financial services center at Wharton (University of Pennsylvania), the 
pharmaceutical and auto centers at MIT, the steel project at Carnegie-Mellon and the food services project at the University of 
Minnesota. The case writer and the research team for this case thus wish to express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation for making this work possible and to the Sloan industry centers for their invaluable assistance. They especially 
appreciate the time and guidance given by the center for research on financial services at Wharton as well as the retail banking 
group at Sanwa. However, the views and interpretations expressed in this case are strictly those of the author and do not 
represent those of Sanwa or its management. 
needed to integrate software packages into something more closely linked with its 
business strategies, markets, and organizational structure. Thus, coming from different 
directions, there appears to be some convergence in approach by these leading software 
users. The cases thus confirm what some other analysts have hypothesized; a coherent 
business strategy is a necessary condition for a successful information technology 
strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).4 These strategic links for Sanwa are presented in the 
following case.5 
This case along with the other cases also illustrates that the implementation and 
design of each company's software and software strategy is unique to its competitive 
situation, industry and strategic objectives. These factors influence how they choose 
3
 This refers to cases for which interviews have been completed. See footnote 3. 
4
 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business working 
paper: William V. Rapp, " Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology: The 
Emergence of Controlled Production," December 1998. Also see: William V. Rapp, "Gaining and Sustaining Long-
term Advantage Using Information Technology: Emergence of Controlled Production," Best Papers Proceedings, 
Association of Japanese Business Studies, Salt Lake City, UT, June 1999. 
5
 All the cases are being written with a strategic focus. That is, they examine each firm's IT strategy as opposed to 
what specific software or IT systems it is using. In this sense the cases illustrate how IT is used to improve 
competitiveness rather than on what specific software a firm is using. The latter is only generally used to illustrate and 
explain the former. This emphasis was not specified when the project was initiated but has evolved as the research has 
progressed. There are three major reasons the case studies have become focused in this way. The first is because at a 
very detailed level all these firms have unique software and information systems due to the way they weave their 
organizations with packaged and custom software. There is thus little other organizations could learn if each case just 
explained the detailed IT system or systems for each firm. In addition, the cases would be very long and would 
quickly drown the reader in data since IT pervades virtually all aspects of these very large corporations. This became 
quite apparent at an early stage in the research when we tried to develop IT organization charts for Takeda, Merck 
and NEC. 
The second is that at a very general level, differences in each firm's IT system can be almost trivial since there are 
only a limited number of operating system options, e.g. IBM mainframes, Unix workstations, and Windows or MAC 
based PCs. Third, information technology changes very rapidly and thus each firm is constantly upgrading and 
evolving its systems. So detailed descriptions of each IT system would rapidly become obsolete. For these reasons, 
focusing the cases on strategic principles has developed as the best way to explain to readers something they could 
use and apply in their own situations. This has been confirmed when we have presented the material in different 
forums as the discussants have commented favorably on the approach. Equally importantly, in our interviews and 
conversations with management, this is where they have wanted to focus their responses. That is, as the various cases 
illustrate, these firms manage their IT decision-making by following a set of strategic principles integrated with their 
view of their competitive environments. This is similar to Nelson and Winter's (1982) rules and routines for other 
kinds of management decisions and innovations, and illustrates these firms' evolutionary approach to IT use and 
development. Their basic reasons for this appear to incorporate the points just noted above, i.e. the uniqueness of 
their systems, their limited operating system options, and IT's rapid technical change. Based on what we have learned, 
therefore, it is these firms' strategic approaches, including the concept of controlled production explained later, that 
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between packaged and customized software options for achieving specific goals and how 
they measure their success. Indeed, as part of their strategic integration, Sanwa and the 
other leading software users interviewed have linked their software strategies with their 
overall management goals through clear mission statements that explicitly note the 
importance of information technology to firm success. 
They have coupled this view with active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT 
(information technology) support group participation in the firm's business and decision 
making structure. Thus, for firms such as Sanwa, the totally independent MIS 
department is a thing of the past. This may be one reason why outsourcing for them has 
not been a real option, though their relatively successful business performance is not 
based solely on software. Rather, as described below, software is an integral element of 
their overall management strategy and plays a key role in serving corporate goals such as 
enhancing productivity, improving account management or strengthening customer 
relations. Thus these systems must be coupled with an appropriate approach to 
marketing, customer service, and new product development reflecting Sanwa's clear 
understanding of their business, their industry and the firm's competitive strengths 
within this context. This clear business vision, especially of the Life Cycle Model 
described below, has enabled management to select, develop and use the software they 
believe is required for each retail banking function and to integrate these into a total 
support system for the bank's operations to achieve corporate objectives. Since this 
vision impacts other corporate decisions, Sanwa also has good human resource and 
seem to have the widest applicability and to offer other firms the most potential insights without becoming dated in 
how to use IT to improve competitiveness. The strategy described here, though, only applies to retail banking. 
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financial characteristics compared to other Japanese banks (Appendices I & II on Retail 
Strategy & Operations as well as Firm & Industry Data). 
Yet Sanwa does share some common themes with other leading software users 
too, such as the creation of large proprietary interactive databases that promote 
automatic feedback between various stages and/or players in the service development, 
delivery and consumption process. Their ability to use IT to economize on traditional 
delivery systems while extending and expanding their customer base are also common to 
other leading software users. In addition, they are able organizationally and 
competitively to build beneficial feedback cycles or loops that increase productivity in 
areas as different as customer service, geographic coverage, and product availability 
while reducing cycle times and improving the production and delivery of services to the 
customer. Better cycle times reduce costs and improve business forecasts since they need 
to cover a shorter time period. Customer satisfaction is enhanced through more timely 
delivery. Thus, software inputs are critical factors in Sanwa's and other leading users' 
overall business strategies with strong positive competitive results for doing it well and 
potentially negative implications for competitors. 
An important consideration in this respect is the possible emergence of a new 
strategic production paradigm, " controlled production", in which Sanwa may be 
participating. Just as mass production dramatically improved on craft production through 
economies of scale using standardized products and lean production improved on mass 
production through making production more continuous and tying it more closely to 
actual demand, "controlled" production seems to significantly improve productivity 
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through monitoring, controlling and linking every aspect of producing and delivering a 
product or service, including after sales service and repair. 
Such controlled production (CP) is only possible by actively using information 
technology and software systems to continuously monitor and control functions that had 
previously formed a rather automatic system response to changes in expected or actual 
consumer demand. This may be why such firms' skillful use of information technology 
is seen by themselves and industry analysts as important to their business success. But 
this is only true when it is integrated with their business from both an operation and 
organization standpoint, reflecting their overall business strategy and clarity of 
competitive vision. Therefore, at Sanwa the software and systems development people 
are part of the decision making structure within the retail division while the system itself 
is an integral part of the way they organize, deliver and support their retail business from 
product development through to forecasting and market intelligence. This sequence is 
particularly critical in retail banking where the demand and supply for particular 
products or services shifts according to age, job status and other demographic variables. 
Therefore, Seagate Technology may be correct for Sanwa too when they state in 
their 1997 Annual Report "We are experiencing a new industrial revolution, one 
more powerful than any before it. In this emerging digital world of the Third 
Millennium, the new currency will be information. How we harness it will mean the 
difference between success and failure, between having competitive advantage and 
being an also-ran." 
In Sanwa's case, as with the other leading software users examined, the key to 
using software successfully is to develop a mix of packaged and customized software 
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that supports the firm's business strategies and differentiates it from competitors. 
However, management has not tried to adapt the organizational structure to the software 
used. Further from their perspective, functional and market gains have justified the 
additional expense incurred in customizing certain systems, including the related costs of 
integrating customized and packaged software into a single information system. This is 
done by assessing the possible business uses of software organizationally and 
operationally, especially its role in enhancing their core competencies or particular retail 
banking functions. They reject the view that information systems are generic products 
best developed by outside vendors who can achieve low cost through economies of scale 
and who can more easily afford to invest in the latest technologies.6 
In undertaking this and the other case studies in order to assess the importance 
for each firm of the kinds of issues noted above, the project team sought to answer 
certain key questions while still recognizing firm, country and industry differences. 
6
 Sanwa and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross-national pairs of 
firms in key industries. In principle, each pair of case studies focuses on a Japanese and American firm in an industry 
where software is a significant and successful input into competitive performance. The firms examined are ones 
recognized by the Sloan industry centers and by their industry as ones using software successfully6. To develop these 
"best-practice" studies, we combined analysis of existing research results with questionnaires and direct interviews. 
Further, to relate these materials to previous work as well as the expertise located in each industry center, we held 
working meetings with each center. In addition, we coupled new questionnaires with the materials used in the 
previous study to either update or obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995). 
This method enabled us to relate each candidate and industry to earlier results. We also worked with the industry 
centers to develop a set of questions that specifically relate to a firm's business strategy and software's role within 
that. Some questions address issues that appear relatively general across industries such as inventory control. Others 
such as managing the IC manufacturing process are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to 
establish the firm's perception of its industry and its competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and 
using a software strategy. The team also contacted customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine 
whether competitive benefits or impacts perceived by the firm were recognized outside the organization. These 
sources provided additional data on measures of competitiveness as well as industry strategies and structure. The case 
studies are thus based on extensive interviews by the project team on software's use and integration into management 
strategies to improve competitiveness in specific industries, augmenting existing data on industry dynamics; firm 
organizational structure and management strategy collected from the Sloan industry enters. In addition, we gathered 
data from outside sources and firms or organizations with which we worked in the earlier project. Finally, the US and 
Japanese companies in each industry that were selected on the basis of being perceived as successfully using software 
in a key role in their competitive strategies. In fact, each saw their use of software in this exact manner while these 
competitive benefits were generally confirmed after further research. 
6 
These have been explained in the summary paper referenced in footnote 3. We have set 
them forth in Appendix I as well where Sanwa's profile is presented based on our 
interviews and other research. Readers who wish to assess for themselves the way 
Sanwa's strategies and approaches to using information technology address these issues 
may wish to review this summary prior to reading the case. For others it may represent a 
useful outline.7 
Introduction to Case 
The case begins by placing Japan's banking industry in a competitive context and 
then examines the governmental policies and economic factors affecting Japanese retail 
banking markets. As one of Japan's leading city banks, Sanwa's evolution and current 
business strategies are an integral part of this development. For example, retail loans 
account for about 10% of total consolidated assets (Sanwa 1998a).8 At the same time, its 
organizational structure and software product choices help one to understand the 
company's use and demand for software. The study concludes by examining Sanwa's 
use of information technology as a tool to create competitive advantage in retail banking. 
The last section summarizes the findings and identifies other potential strategic benefits. 
However, to appreciate the role of information technology within Sanwa's retail banking 
7
 The questions are broken into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy, Industry 
Related Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human Resources and Organization, 
Various Metrics such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction, and finally some Conclusions and 
Results. They cover a range of issues from direct use of software to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate 
strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational integration, 
to beneficial loops, to training and institutional dynamics, and finally to inter-industry comparisons. These are 
summarized for Sanwa in Appendix I. 
8
 Approximately Yen 5.5 trillion is divided roughly 80% for housing and 20% for other loans (Sanwa 1998a). 
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group, some important industry market and economic characteristics need to be 
explained first. 
The Industry Context: Retail Banking in Japan 
In their 1997 review of the Japanese City banks (Morita and Ogawa 1997), 
Salomon Brothers could only lament these banks' gloomy prospects as they had in their 
1996 review (Ogawa 1996). Similarly, the senior-banking analyst at Nikko Securities 
(Sasajima 1997) commented that "there were no bright spots in Japanese banking," a 
view shared by a senior manager at Moody's Investor Services' Tokyo office. Indeed, as 
a result of the collapse of Japan's Economic Bubble that had propelled Japanese stock 
and real estate prices to ethereal levels in the late 1980s (Rapp 1997), banks have 
predictably been facing major defaults on their loan portfolios. This is especially true of 
loans collateralized by real estate and securities (K. Ogawa 1998). This has resulted in 
massive loan write-offs in 1998/99 and more recently substantial inputs of government 
capital. 
Further, because the banks were permitted under BIS guidelines to count 45% of 
their appreciated equity portfolios as part of their capital structure, the collapse of 
Japan's stock market has sharply reduced the banks' capital at the same time that it has 
increased their loan losses. This situation has meant that as they have realized some of 
their remaining stock and other asset appreciation to cover loan losses, their actual 
reserves have been significantly diminished. Indeed, as of September 1998, latent stock 
profits for Japan's City Banks were a negative Yen 1.1 trillion as against remaining non-
performing and restructured loans of Yen 12.3 trillion and loan loss reserves of Yen 7.2 
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trillion (Choy 1999). In addition, since the banks have only begun to fully recognize 
their losses and actual bad loans could easily be more than twice currently recognized 
levels, many analysts feel at least another two years is required to reflate their balance 
sheets (Choy 1999). Their prospects therefore continue to appear quite dim.9 
Summarizing recent performance, Japan's city banks' operating profits for the year 
ended March 1997 declined by 23.2% due to a decrease in net interest margins. There 
was no domestic loan growth, and bonds appreciated little as interest rates were at 
basement levels. 
Because this basic situation continued for the years ending March 1998 and 1999, 
the city banks' operating profits declined more. Further, the writing-off of "disclosed" 
problem loans may take more time. So the total loan problem could continue another 
three to five years for some banks. As these problem loans must be carried at a negative 
spread, they act as a drag on earnings and the recovery in the banks' balance sheets. A 
further earnings drag comes from the stocks which have been sold and repurchased to 
cover loan losses because they are not paying dividends sufficient to cover their carrying 
costs in terms of the interest paid on deposits. Therefore, recovery in the banks' capital 
base other than through recent and future government capital injections still seems well 
in the future. 
When their US counterparts faced similar problems due to the S&L crisis of the 
mid-80s, the Fed also pursued a low interest rate policy to help the banks reflate their 
balance sheets, and the Resolution Trust Company bought problem loans and took over 
9 As of March 1998, Sanwa's loan loss reserves were Yen 1.0 trillion and net latent stock profits were Yen 332 
billion against problem loans of Yen 1.3 trillion (Sanwa 1998). But on 9/30/99, they were 0.9 trillion Yen and minus 
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failing institutions. There was also considerable industry consolidation, and dramatic 
downsizing accompanied this restructuring. However, Japan is currently unable to 
pursue several of these options. 
First, the Bank of Japan has lowered rates as much as they can, almost to zero. 
Also, because they started from very low levels, they are facing political pressures from 
savers who have seen their interest income on deposits fall dramatically. The Fed had the 
luxury of coming down from higher rates. Second, Japanese taxpayers until recently 
refused to support a bailout of the banks' excessive loan policies. So the Japanese 
equivalent of the RTC, the CCPC, is funded by bank loans (Packer 1998), and 
government support until the recent capital injections has been limited to the normal tax 
relief resulting from loan losses. Further, even this relief has been limited as many banks 
continued to report profits despite their deteriorating loan portfolios (Cargill 1998). 
Therefore, the eventual resolution of the problem is very much dependent on expanding 
bank earnings. Finally, though there have been several mergers between stronger and 
weaker banks, real consolidation has been severely limited by Japan's permanent 
employment system. That is, despite the mergers, over the past three years, there has 
been little reduction in S, G&A. Indeed, it has risen slightly due to a sevenfold increase 
in deposit insurance premiums. (See Appendix II on Firm and Industry data as well as 
Smart Money 1999.) 
Exacerbating these problems is continued economic weakness which limits 
domestic loan demand as does the fact that large Japanese corporations are not 
borrowing from banks since they can borrow directly on their own credit more cheaply 
(loss) 24 billion Yen respectively against problem loans of 1.4 trillion Yen (1998a). 
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(K. Ogawa 1998). Thus, it is hardly surprising that like their US counterparts they have 
turned to high growth overseas markets, derivatives, and retail banking to develop new 
and more profitable business. However, with all large city banks facing the same 
business and economic environment, most have sought similar solutions, and their 
expansion into Asia only accentuated their problems due to the Asian Financial Crisis 
(Cargill 1998). Therefore, the strategic problem in retail banking as in the other areas is 
how to differentiate one's product and services from other banks, how to avoid more 
credit problems and most importantly how to create a lasting competitive edge given 
Japan's highly regulated banking environment. 
Historically, of course, most Japanese City banks have grown and developed as 
corporate banks. Indeed, this was a conscious government policy after the Second World 
War in which households were seen as sources of savings to be channeled to a rapidly 
growing industrial sector (Ueda 1998). Indeed, banks and bank managers were judged 
on their ability to grow deposits (Rapp 1997). It was only in the 1970s as the oil crises 
and Nixon shock led to a substantial decline in economic growth rates that Japanese city 
banks began to explore retail banking as an opportunity, often sending trainees to the US 
to study US retail banks. Their interest in retail banking in turn was boosted by the 
financial liberalization of the 1980s which allowed large Japanese corporations to raise 
funds directly in the global financial markets and accelerated the decline in corporate 
lending (Rapp 1997, Ogawa, K. 1998 and Patrick 1997). It was at this time that several 
Japanese city banks acquired and expanded retail operations in California such as 
Sumitomo Bank of California, Bank of Tokyo which combined its California First with 
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Union Bank, Mitsubishi Bank which bought Bank of California, as well as Tokai, Mitsui 
and Sanwa. 
Nevertheless, it was not easy for the City Banks to shift gears from corporate 
lending not only because of inexperience but because many promising areas of potential 
retail expansion were restricted due to the continued compartmentalization of Japanese 
finance (Rapp 1997 and Horiuchi 1998). This has only recently begun to change with the 
prospects of the "Big Bang" (Horiuchi 1998 and K. Ogawa 1998). Previously, they 
could not expand into money management, which required a trust bank license, nor 
could they even issue credit cards because MITI and the finance companies controlled 
this activity. Only recently have they been able to issue real credit cards rather than cash 
debit cards so that credit cards and consumer credit can emerge as an important area of 
expansion and development. With respect to home mortgages, origination and bundling 
of mortgages has had no supporting secondary market, and the government's housing 
loan program is a direct competitor rather than a supporter as in the US. With the 
coming of Japan's "Big Bang", however, many of these restrictions will disappear and 
new competitive opportunities will develop (Choy 1999). This is both a benefit and risk 
for Sanwa and the other City Banks. It is a benefit because of the new markets into 
which they can expand and the new services they can offer. It is a risk due to the influx 
of many powerful new competitors. 
Sanwa Bank's Retail Banking Strategy 
Within this economic and competitive context, Sanwa's retail banking strategy is 
dependent on three basic aspects of their business: 1) their retail banking infrastructure, 
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including branches and information network; 2) their retail marketing strategy; and 3) 
their evaluation of the Japanese people's lifestyle or pattern of personal development. 
Though very difficult, they make a particular effort to manage and analyze the statistical 
data related to the last two aspects in order to differentiate their products and services 
from competitors and retain these customers on a long term basis. 
The basic information infrastructure for the retail banking division is controlled 
from Sanwa's headquarters in Ohtemachi and a central concern here is to use IT to 
control costs since the bank is very conscious of the expense of delivering a service to a 
particular market segment. Sanwa's strategic approach to this business problem has been 
to develop a matrix and identify different customer groups and their different banking 
needs according to their current lifestyle (Sanwa 1998). In turn, they closely analyze the 
costs and returns via the 2 major ways of delivering products or services. The first is the 
traditional way through full service branches, each with its own sales force. This is 
typical of other Japanese banks as well. The second approach is electronically via the 
telephone, the Internet, ATMs, credit cards, mail, etc. The traditional way is very 
expensive, particularly relative to the potential returns from certain new market 
segments such as young people just starting their careers. Yet, Sanwa recognizes it is 
very important to capture these people as customers since this segment is the fastest 
growing retail banking market in Japan. In addition, as these individuals progress 
through their lives, their economic needs and earning power will grow, and they will 
become more and more profitable customers. 
Competing for high net worth individuals is another segment that includes 
competitors such as Citibank whose current target customer is the individual or family 
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with at least Yen 300 million in assets. However, while Sanwa is looking at forming a 
private banking capability, it is just in the process of developing one through the 
affiliation with Toyo Trust described below along with the purchase of Yamaichi's Trust 
Company. Rather, they are focusing on the people they can reach electronically and 
through direct marketing campaigns such as the mail-in account-opening program they 
promoted in 1996 through 800 fast food shops in Tokyo and Osaka where their branches 
are concentrated. 
To people in their twenties and thirties Sanwa offers a particular set of products 
such as ATMs, credit cards, etc. while to those in their forties and fifties who have 
married, they want to expand their loans for housing, weddings, and education. In the 
case of mortgages, they think the market is big enough that they can compete through 
supplementing the loans available from the Housing Bureau. In fact this has been an 
expanding area for many banks as mortgage loans rose by 10% in 1996 and 5.4% in 
1997 (Appendix II) and 80% of Sanwa's current consumer loans are housing related 
(Sanwa 1998a). For those entering retirement or who are wealthy, they will offer 
products such as funds management and private banking. In effect as people's banking 
and credit needs change, the Bank's retail marketing strategy will change with them. But 
for this strategy to be effective, the bank must gather and manage a wide range of 
information about their client base so they can offer these products in a personal and 
timely way. This approach has parallels with Meiji Life's new system for their life 
insurance representatives, indicating that at least two leading software users in Japanese 
financial services are pursuing similar strategies to deal with both the existing 
competition and the effects of future deregulation, i.e. the "Big Bang". 
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Making the strategy work therefore requires Sanwa to efficiently track its large 
and growing customer base in terms of individual needs and to then deliver products to 
that base efficiently and profitably. Thus, the bank needs low cost delivery into each 
segment. As noted above, Sanwa spends considerable effort in evaluating costs and 
believes it is very good at implementing such a strategy. Further, they recognize this has 
become even more important as Japan's "Big Bang" has gotten underway in 1999. This 
is because increased competition will decrease revenues further while increasing 
marketing costs. At the same time, it has become very important to target the first time 
customer. However, the big City Banks cannot afford to do this via the "face-to-face" 
banking typical of the traditional large full service branches with their tellers and calling 
officers, and so far there has been no movement to smaller or scaled-down branches. 
In any case, Sanwa's approach has been to increase direct banking by mail, 
phone and Internet as well as the number of automated or unmanned branches. They call 
this " direct-to-consumer" banking (Sanwa 1998). As part of this strategy, they are also 
experimenting with PC banking. They and some of the other big banks are working with 
NTT on this, and it will allow the deposit and transfer of money via PC. In the 
meanwhile in February 1998 they were the first to offer a 24-hour telephone banking 
service accessible globally as well as Internet access (Sanwa 1998). They have also 
found this approach ties into their idea of people of different ages having different 
financial needs. That is, they have found younger customers are busier and more 
technologically sophisticated. So they prefer the longer hours and greater flexibility of 
Sanwa's automated branches whose ATMs are now available 24 hours a-day including 
Saturdays and Sundays, the first bank to do so (Choy 1999 and Sanwa 1998). This is 
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because these customers often cannot come to a branch during business hours of 9:00 
AM-3:00 PM. 
Still, through direct marketing and electronic means, Sanwa has found it can 
build a structure that will support a long-term banking relationship. It is not clear how 
Sanwa takes the revenues or profits from this prospective long term relationship into 
account in determining the profitability of adding a new customer versus the cost of 
servicing and supporting that customer. Nevertheless, they believe such new customers 
are basically somewhat profitable from the beginning, based on the size of their accounts, 
their credit card usage and the low cost of electronic support. However, Sanwa is 
presently analyzing this assumption in more detail and expects to refine it by type of 
customer over time. This indicates they recognize that strategically using software 
information and information technology is a dynamic and continuous process. In 
addition, it is one that not only improves product delivery but lowers costs. For example, 
having developed a method to measure the profitability of each structure and service by 
customer segment, the retail division' management now knows that automated or 
"unmanned" branches with "full-service" ATMs cost 1/5th that of a "manned" full 
service branch. They estimate that PC banking will be even cheaper at l/8th to 1/10th 
the cost of a regular teller. Both delivery systems are of course available for longer hours 
at little additional cost. 
They also know that they have been able to improve products and services such 
as cash access compared to delivery in the branches. They have a scoring model that 
helps them evaluate this for each customer segment, and they use customer surveys as 
part of this continuous evaluation process. This has resulted in increased share among 
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the bank's targeted customers, i.e. those in their 20s and 30s, in areas where they have 
opened automated branches through direct mail. Given the low cost of these branches, 
this business has been profitable for them while also building their relationship-banking 
base. Thus they see their strategy of adding some 700 of these branches in Osaka and 
Tokyo to their 360 regular or full service branches as having been very successful in 
terms of both the bank's current and long-term strategic retail banking goals. In addition, 
ATMs and automated branches are system intensive and are thus subject to user base 
economics (Rapp May 1997) in that each additional user reduces the cost of delivery to 
others by spreading the fixed systems costs over more and more users. Success in this 
area is subject to a beneficial loop of increasing returns and greater profits. A clear 
indication of the benefits to the bank of this strategy is its recent announcement that it 
will be closing 50% of its regular full-service branches compared to only around 12% 
for their major competitors. This will give Sanwa tremendous cost and operating profit 
advantages at a time when bank earnings and capital are under great pressure (Smart 
Money 1999). 
Interestingly, the banking analyst at Nikko did not recognize this beneficial loop 
as he used the traditional measure of the number and size of the deposits that were added 
by each new customer instead of looking at the whole relationship including credit card 
usage and the low cost of delivery. For example, given that these branches are one-fifth 
the cost of a full service branch, only one-fifth the deposit or relationship size is needed 
to justify the investment. The low marginal cost of servicing each account is another 
plus. That is, full service ATMs that can personally deliver many services are also only 
1/5th the cost of a teller and are very far advanced since Sanwa began this unmanned 
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ATM strategy in 1989. It therefore now has over 1000 branches throughout Japan, more 
than any other bank, with the benefits in terms of trimming its full service branches 
noted above. (Their regular branches of course all have "Quick Lobbies" so that they 
combine some of the convenience and efficiency features of the unmanned branches as 
well.) 
In addition, the retail management's approach is a dynamic process in that they 
are constantly adding to the number of functions and services that the unmanned 
branches can handle as well as expanding the hours during which these services are 
available (Sanwa 1998). This is part of the constant strategic upgrading and development 
of the bank's IT and retail banking delivery system that has allowed it to increasingly 
shift away from regular full-service branches. The basic decision criterion in this respect 
has been to replace people by machines, to diversify the delivery system, and to reduce 
costs, all through extending the use of electronic money. However, management always 
keeps in mind all their customers' needs so those customers do not feel alienated by the 
shift in delivery structures. The use of the debit card is a clear illustration of this since 
this will be a prepaid cash card when it arrives. Though this already exists in some forms, 
such as the Pachinko Card and the NTT phone card, this will extend its use more widely. 
Similarly, it is developing the capability to manage and sell investment trusts, which will 
appeal to their older clients planning for college, weddings, and retirement (Sanwa 1998). 
The benefits to Sanwa and its 17 million retail clients (Sanwa 1999) of this 
tailoring of services/products, and their delivery by age and family circumstance for each 
market segment should grow as the effects of the "Big Bang" accelerate. Part of this 
strategy will also involve greater co-operation with affiliates such as Toyo Trust (Choy 
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1999). The two banks plan to "create a company to market a Japanese version of 401(k) 
pension plans as well as share ATM networks and jointly run multifunctional branches. 
Toyo Trust will merge with Sanwa Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. And absorb Sanwa's 
custody operations. Sanwa Bank will take over Toyo Trust's overseas loan business" 
(Choy 1999). This has necessitated working out ways to deliver joint products and share 
in the profits. Another example is the proposed "cash card" mentioned above. The 
emergence of one-bank holding companies may further facilitate this process since if 
Sanwa puts various related entities under a single corporate umbrella, the holding 
company structure may allow them to work more closely together. 
Information Technology Infrastructure 
Sanwa's base information system is a typical Japanese "three-tier" mainframe 
system similar to most other Japanese banks (Rapp 1995). The mainframes manage a 
series of servers that in turn manage the PCs, ATMs and Workstations (Sanwa 1998). In 
turn, they have developed their own software, largely because it is a real time on-line 
system that must be totally integrated with their own business operations. When they go 
outside the bank such as with credit and cash cards, they must only interface with NTT 
Data who represents the actual interface with the VISA and MasterCard networks. NTT 
Data controls and manages those relationships for all the Japanese banks. So Sanwa is 
not involved except in setting up and managing the protocol interfaces with the 
mainframes that handle customer accounts. 
In terms of communicating with its ATMs and within the bank, it uses its own 
leased lines with the public system as a back up. The capacity is sufficient for this 
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purpose. In terms of communicating with other banks or lenders for credit purposes, 
there are three basic databases to which Sanwa has access, though presently this is only 
for negative information. That is, the databases are only allowed to transmit information 
when a problem exists. Therefore, the banks, including Sanwa, have no way of 
measuring total credit exposure in order to anticipate when a problem might develop. 
These systems are the Shinyo Joho System or All Bank Information system, the Credit 
Card information system and the Sarakin or CCB system. These systems have been 
separated primarily due to reluctance by their users to share information as well as some 
turf issues between the MOF and MITI. However, because of the recently depressed 
economic environment, there has been a growing recognition of the need for various 
lenders to avoid heavy debt situations and to share information. Thus, there is some 
work to integrate the three. But to successfully use this information to actually reduce 
credit problems among retail customers will in turn involve integrating data bases and 
credit management skills, including the development of credit profiles such as those 
developed and used by US banks and credit card companies over the last 10 years. 
Customers, Culture and Strategic Organization 
In many ways Sanwa's approach to introducing an automated delivery structure 
is more customer oriented in terms of their basic strategy than a US bank's, though over 
time it may arrive at an even more automated system. That is, just because something is 
cheaper and technically feasible, the bank has not tried to force it if the customers want 
something else. Rather it has developed and promoted what it believes is demanded by 
each customer segment these systems are designed to serve, either currently or over the 
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customer's life cycle. Sanwa has thus integrated the clients into its strategic delivery 
system and has formalized this in its Consumer Direct Banking Center (Sanwa 1998). 
In addition, its human resource (HR) policies are more aligned than their US 
counterparts (Harker 1997) in that those segments that demand automation are getting it, 
while those that demand customer service in terms of teller contact and cross selling are 
getting that. Permanent employment is probably a plus here since the bank has excess 
personnel it can allocate to these tasks. Also, in both the US and Japan, phone use 
defines customer behavior and is difficult to change. Thus, US banks appear to be 
pursuing an uphill strategic effort in getting customers to change to use more telephonic 
and automated delivery systems (Harker 1997). However, the Japanese banks by going 
more with the flow, are only using telephonic means to reach those who feel most 
comfortable with this medium, i.e. younger Japanese customers. In essence Sanwa has 
found it easier to align its delivery and HR systems with its customers rather than try to 
get the customers to align themselves with the bank's cost driven strategy. The former 
approach takes additional revenues or net return over time into consideration whereas 
the latter does not. From a strategic perspective, the former should be more user-friendly, 
successful and profitable over time.10 
At a meeting at Columbia in September 1997, Wharton Professor Harker who is leading a large project on retail 
banking and software systems explained that the results of his investigation of the retail function at large US 
commercial banks demonstrated the need to align HR with strategy. But in fact most US banks do not. For example, 
he noted if a bank is using college graduates, then it should expect inputs into the system from which it will get 
benefits. However, if a system is well established, and the bank does not expect employees to manage it, such as 
cross-selling, then it should be less demanding of educational requirements, though this is not usually the case. 
The process Harker's team used to establish this research result was mapping IT and management process across 
parallel functions, such as opening an account, a CD, changing an address, etc., etc. From this, they found efficiency 
matters in terms of both cost and customer perception. In addition, consistency was key to such efficiency and 
customer perception, but is dependent on who controls the system. If it is the person adding value, the customer 
comes first; if it is the person managing MIS, then system cost per unit predominates. 
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However, as was explained in the introduction, for firms in the best practice sample, these two perceptions and 
functions are more integrated. So system costs are balanced against customer value and revenues. Thus at Sanwa 
there is someone who controls the whole retail process, including the related system. To the extent this is not true at 
other banks, those banks will be at a competitive disadvantage. Maintaining such a balance, though, means constantly 
understanding how and why something is being done. Indeed, Harker indicated it was critical for firms to think about 
how and why they did things so they could understand the reasons why and could then make rational choices 
concerning business systems. This is obvious from the case studies such as Sanwa since such understanding allows 
the "best-practice firms" to make IT and software choices for rationally explainable business reasons. When this is 
not true for competitors, they will suffer. Harker also pointed out that the best performers involved customers as part 
of the process, i.e. the total business process. Simplistically, this means it does not pay to offer checking accounts if 
people only want money market accounts. Therefore, if as a bank you want customers to use a particular service 
delivery channel, it should be one that serves the customer's needs and interests. 
In fact what has happened in the U.S. is that as finance channels have expanded customers have used new channels 
but have not stopped using the old ones. Thus anticipated cost reductions have not occurred. Interestingly, Sanwa's 
approach has avoided this problem as they have not tried to change the behavior patterns of old or current customers. 
Rather they have designed packages of services and delivery systems through their ATMs and branches to reach a 
different and new customer segment for which these services are specifically targeted. Their pre-selection and 
targeting of services by customer group thus largely solves the problem which US retail banks have yet to solve. 
Further, Sanwa's approach and structure effectively maps revenue expectations both currently and over the customer 
life cycle against delivery cost and service expectations. This is another problem whose solution has so far eluded 
many U.S. banks. U.S. banks' expansion of branches and ATMs has not only not decreased costs but has not brought 
in additional customers or revenues. Conversely, Sanwa's targeted market segmentation approach has done all of this 
by matching customer demands with a dedicated delivery system. 
In the new paradigm, automation clearly makes sense due to Sanwa's segmentation and life cycle strategies, which 
are valid in a Japanese context. Nationwide banks and the low mobility of labor compared to the U.S., means once a 
bank has a customer it can usually retain them. This approach appears similar to American Express' active solicitation 
of college students. Harker also cited the effect of what seem to be different goals for Japanese and U.S. banks. U.S. 
banks want to optimize return on risk adjusted assets. This is a financial or balance sheet management goal and is 
consistent with Moody's comments that Japanese banks need to learn how to manage risk in their asset portfolios. 
(This is somewhat reflected in Sanwa's 1998 Annual Report as well.) However, from an historical standpoint, 
Japanese banks do not have much experience at this kind of management since during most of the postwar period 
they lent to very large firms, collateralized by assets appreciating due to inflation. 
In addition, banks did not really expect repayment; i.e. the loans were evergreen. The emphasis was therefore on 
gathering deposits to make loans that were seen as inherently riskless. All this changed in the 1980s as large 
companies financed themselves directly in the market and banks were forced to shift to riskier borrowers and to really 
rely on the collateralized assets which imploded with the collapse of the Bubble (Horiuchi 1998 and K. Ozawa 1998). 
That is, the banks have suffered from a huge systemic collapse due to a major change in national asset allocations 
rather than from bad loan-by-loan analysis. Conversely, US banks have had to concentrate on cash flow and balance 
sheet management since in the 1970s and 80s as they faced the issue of dis-intermediation and growing capital 
requirements while asset inflation was never as great as in Japan. However, Sanwa's new global risk management 
committee and risk assessment procedures (Sanwa 1998) indicate they recognize loan losses as a critical strategic 
problem that must be addressed on a consistent and long term basis, especially as their business develops globally and 
moves beyond traditional Japanese customers. 
Nevertheless, Japanese banks are presently emphasizing current operating earnings per employee as a critical goal and 
indicator of efficiency as well as operating expenses as a percent of operating revenues (Sanwa 1997 and 1998). Such 
measures put a natural focus on automation that complements Sanwa's segmentation strategy for the market. Further, 
given the strategic alignment problems noted by Harker for U.S. banks in delivering retail services, Sanwa's approach 
may be even more appropriate. Also, given Japan's currently very low cost of capital and the relatively high cost 
personnel in financial services, especially in terms of the permanent employment system, heavy emphasis on 
automation may be appropriate given factor cost allocation too. 
Sanwa has studied each segment or customer group and knows what each customers is looking for in banking and 
other financial services. Further, it monitors these groups and keeps information in service delivery loops so when an 
event is coming, it can solicit the related business on a targeted basis, e.g. college loans when child gets to be that age. 
This is built into the life cycle concept and the matching of services with customer profiles. It also means mailings 
and other direct marketing efforts are more specific to customers' needs and thus have a greater chance of success 
than the generalized shotgun approach used by most U.S. banks. Further, being able to do this efficiently and know 
the revenues generated by a new marketing effort will cover the cash outflow is important in an environment where 
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Summary 
Due to Big Bang pressures, the decline in corporate lending and the entrance of 
all Japanese City Banks into retail banking, Sanwa has been forced to develop a retail 
banking approach that will differentiate it from other banks as well as new competitors 
such as life insurance and securities companies. Their strategy has emphasized 
automated branches to deliver an expanding range of services related to their life cycle 
model of customers' requirements which is analogous to that used by Meiji Life. To 
differentiate their strategy from competitors, Sanwa's management depends on three 
basic elements 1) the bank's retail banking infrastructure, including branches and IT 
network; 2) their retail marketing strategy; and 3) management's evaluation of 
customers' patterns of personal development throughout their lives. Though difficult, 
Sanwa makes a special effort to manage and analyze data related to the last two. This is 
because it envisions their customers as having an evolving and growing set of financial 
needs that change during their lives. When the customers are young and starting to work, 
their needs are likely to be for credit cards and consumer related financial products. 
When they marry, they will need debt products such as mortgages for an apartment that 
expands to a house and life insurance as they have children. Then there are savings 
products for college, weddings and retirement. The key to the bank's success in 
loans are being written off or restructured so their balance sheet contribution to cash flow is deteriorating. Therefore, 
from a long term perspective, it would seem a bank needs a management and strategic mix of both operating 
efficiency, where Sanwa appears to be ahead of most U.S. banks, and balance sheet risk management efficiency 
where the Americans may be ahead. In essence, integrated service delivery is only viable if the information delivery 
needed to support that service and related products is also integrated and is strategically aligned with business goals 
and objectives. Consistent with this dictum, Sanwa's adds functions over time to the basic automated delivery 
structure both as this is technically feasible and is demanded by the customer segments these systems are designed to 
serve, either currently or over the life cycle. Thus Sanwa is very customer oriented in terms of its IT strategy because 
it has integrated it into its strategic delivery system. In addition, their HR policies are aligned too in that those 
segments demanding automation are getting it while those demanding customer service in terms of teller contact and 
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implementing this strategy is tracking, marketing and delivering these products on a 
timely basis. The bank must also assure product development evolves in a way 
responsive to changes in lifestyle and technology. These factors require the bank 
determines how valuable on a discounted basis a particular type of consumer is and how 
easily the bank can retain them throughout the cycle. In addition, the system must signal 
the appropriate time to start marketing, how much investment should be made per 
customer and what is the most effective way to both market and deliver a special product 
or service? 
To address these and related strategic issues, Sanwa has developed a matrix 
identifying different customer groups and their banking needs according to lifestyle. It 
cross matches this with a set of products for which it carefully controls costs. The 
primary target is young people just starting their careers who are the fastest growing 
retail banking market segment in Japan with the greatest long-term potential. However, 
they are expensive to service via traditional branch banking but can be efficiently 
serviced electronically via automated branches, telephone and the Internet. Still, Sanwa's 
approach appeals to this market segment's greater acceptance of technology and then 
follows them as they progress through their lives, their earning power grows and their 
financial needs expand. It does this by offering them new products tailored to their 
changing financial needs. 
Furthermore, by getting them acquainted with automated banking at an early date 
and by constantly increasing the number and quality of services offered through its 
cross selling are getting that. Permanent employment may be a plus here, but it is also a function of Sanwa's basic 
retail banking strategy. 
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automated branches that are much cheaper to open and maintain, Sanwa hopes to 
improve customer contact, reduce customer migration and keep costs low. By targeting 
and reinforcing the technological bias of this group, they are thus using IT to influence 
customer behavior, tie them to Sanwa on an interactive basis, and grow an increasingly 
profitable customer segment. But for the strategy to work, Sanwa must gather and 
manage a range of information about this client base so they can offer products in a 
personal and timely way while constantly improving the efficiency and user appeal of 
their systems. 
Interestingly, this approach avoids the problem that has impacted some U.S. 
banks when they have unsuccessfully tried to change existing client behavior to force the 
customer to use electronic systems. Rather, Sanwa's view is to match products and 
delivery systems with the targeted customer segment. In this way they stay truly 
customer oriented since the bank continues to serve traditional clients through its branch 
network. In sum, Sanwa has studied each segment and knows what products and services 
those customers want and how they want them delivered. It uses IT to monitor these and 
keep the information in service delivery loops so when a customer event occurs it can 
solicit related business. This reinforces customer acceptance of the life cycle approach 
and builds the basis for Sanwa's own success in this important business segment. Since 
this segment is less volatile and lower risk than traditional business lending or other new 
banking growth areas such as derivatives or Asia, this will also help to reestablish their 
earnings and capital base. Given current economic conditions, these developments are 
very critical for their competitive position compared to other Japanese City Banks. This 
is one reason why several analysts rate them among the three big City Banks most likely 
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to emerge from the current crisis and the "Big Bang" as leaders in Japanese finance 
(Smart Money 1999). 
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